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freedom for the entire world. The fact that the United States is in the mi-
nority with respect to maintenance of the civil jury system proffers no
real reason to abandon that system.69
Some claim that the jury is costly, but "cost is small when compared to
justice wrought. Cost is meager when weighed against corruption which
could ensue from jury elimination."70 It is argued that a great deal of in-
come is lost because people are called off their jobs. But it is the price we
must pay for the jury system.
CONCLUSION
The civil jury system should be maintained along with the requirement
of unanimity. This system provides protection for minority rights, receives
more public acceptance and can perform its function of finding the facts
better than any alternative system. Unanimity prevents hasty decisions,
and the result of jury deliberation avoids the mistake of any one individual
entering the verdict.
Illinois, with its new court system, increased number of judges, and the
statutory safeguards, appears well on the way to solving these problems.
"The jury trial system has stood the test of history. The wisdom of our
day unites with that of the ages in validating jury trial in preference to
spurious substitutes.""
It was said by Chief Justice Earl Warren, of the United States Supreme
Court that, "[t]he men and women who are called upon to serve on juries
in both our federal and state courts have maintained a standard of fairness
and excellence throughout the history of our country. They have demon-
strated a vision and will toward the administration of justice that is a well-
spring of inspiration." 72
Howard Frank
69 THE DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, INC., Op. cit. supra note 20 at 7.
70 Ibid. 71 Lambert, supra note 10 at 23.
72 THE DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, INC., Op. cit. supra note 20 at 1.
ABOLITION OF THE CIVIL JURY: PROPOSED
ALTERNATIVES
The principal purpose of our civil courts is to hear with reasonable
promptitude such controversies as arise between our citizens and to decide
them with due dispatch. If any adjunct in the administration of justice
unduly retards or frustrates that ultimate end, then the legislature should
remedy or eliminate that undesirable impediment by applying the science
of law to procedure.
COMMENTS
If it is acknowledged that "justice delayed is justice denied," it is the
intent of this paper to establish that the civil jury system is the primary
cause of the delay and congestion found in courts throughout the country,
and more particularly in Cook County, Illinois. Further, it will be dem-
onstrated that the only practical and efficient means of eliminating this
delay and congestion is to abolish the civil jury system and substitute a
state judiciary system.
However, the constitution of the State of Illinois guarantees to the citi-
zens of Illinois the right to a trial by jury.' It is the purpose of this paper
to influence the state legislature to propose to the citizens of Illinois a
revision to the constitution, eliminating this guaranty to a jury in a civil
action so that the legislature could adopt a system more able to cope with
the increasing tide of litigation created by a more urban and complex
society. The constitution of the State of Illinois should be revised to
correspond to the provision of the constitution of the State of Louisiana,2
or if the legislature finds such a provision too restricted, then a provision
similar to those found in the constitution of rhe States of Colorado3 and
Utah 4 should be urged.
An amendment in the nature of the Colorado and Utah provisions would
permit more flexibility in the manner in which the Illinois State Legislature
might approach the problem of eliminating court congestion and would
probably be more acceptable to the citizens of Illinois who may resist any
change in the constitution affecting their personal rights. Such a provision
would allow the legislature to adopt systems extending from simple pro-
cedural modification through substantive changes and perhaps even com-
plete abolition of the civil jury system.
In order to justify a modification or the abolition of the civil jury sys-
tem, it is first necessary to determine its faults, if any, and analyze them
with a view toward their relevance in achieving the goal, i.e., prompt and
1 ILL. CONST. art. II, § 5: "The right of trial by jury- as heretofore enjoyed, shall re-
main inviolate ......
2 LA. CONST. art. I, § 9: "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right
to a speedy public trial .. "
3 CoLo. CO NST. art. II, § 23: "The right of trial by jury, shall remain inviolate in
criminal cases. .. ."
4 UTAH CoNsT. art. I, § 10: "In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain
inviolate. . . ." Although the constitutional provisions of Colorado and Utah provide
that a jury in civil cases may consist of less than twelve persons, no specific guaranty
of a jury in civil cases is provided in either constitution. The Colorado Supreme Court
held that there is no constitutional right to a jury in civil cases in Miller v. O'Brien,
75 Colo. 117, 223 Pac. 1088 (1924). There have been no decisions construing the Utah
provision, but since the Utah provision was furnished after Colorado's, it is likely
that Utah will decide the issue in a similar manner. See Degnan, Right to Civil Jury
Trial in Utah: Constitution and Statute, 8 UTAH L. R. 97 (1962).
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just adjudication of civil controversies. The two elements of judicial ad-
ministration with which we are primarily concerned are, therefore, the
quality of justice dispensed by the system and the quantity of justice so
dispensed.
It is contended by many jurists that the civil jury system is a useless
anachronism in our society which usurps the function of the legislature
by making new law instead of applying the enacted law.5 In effect, we,
like past generations, have clung to the unrecognizable remnants of the
original system. We engage in mimicry by selecting the numbers of our
modern jury from political subdivisions hundreds of square miles in area
and peopled by thousands of inhabitants. We have attempted through the
years to adapt a system created to meet the needs of a sacred, rural society
to an urban, industrialized society with its wholly secondary relationships
and increasing complexities.
We have evolved a comprehensive legal procedure that not only per-
mits, but encourages the exclusion of jurors possessing the slightest knowl-
edge of the facts he is supposedly summoned to determine. Thus, that
which specifically qualified one to act as a juror at the inception of the
system now specifically disqualifies him. This evolution has been termed
progress. It is contended the system has adapted and improved in ordel
to cope with the growing demands resulting from an increasingly complex
society. If this is true, the system has failed. It has failed both to cope with
the increasing tide of litigation and to render decisions consistent with the
laws of society. It has always been the function of the jury to determine
the facts of the case and to apply the laws of society to those facts. Not-
withstanding, the jury not infrequently refuses to apply the enacted law.
For example, the jury often disregards the doctrine of contributory negli-
gence in favor of comparative negligence in tort cases." Many would
justify these results by labeling the action of the jury as a new function
of the jury, tempering the laws of society with the conscience of the
5 See Comment, 15 DE PAUL L. REv. 398 (1966). One has only to look to the history
and origin of the system to see that it was established in answer to the peculiar needs
of a society which no longer exists. The civil jury system developed into its present
form under Henry II (1154-1189) and became fixed in that form. It developed out
of feudal notions of justice to serve the needs of a rural, agrarian society. The
original protagonists of the jury system provided that the members of the jury be
selected from a narrowly circumscribed vicinage to insure that they would be judged
by those most likely to be supporters. Furthermore, they required as prerequisites of
those who would act as jurors that they have an acquaintance not only with the
parties litigant but also with the facts germane to the issue. Even when it later evolved
that to qualify as a juror, one could not personally be acquainted with the facts of
the case, the requirements that the juror be chosen from the same vicinage continued
to be rule and continues today.
6See FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL (1949); GALSTON, BEHIND THE JUDICIAL CURTAIN
(1951); GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY (1930).
COMMENTS
community. This argument admits that the jury not only ignores the law
but, that it is the function of the jury to do ,so. Thus, the duty to make
new laws for the society is withdrawn from the legislatures and is de-
volved upon a body of twelve men who puri~ortedly represent a cross-
section of the community. This theory denies the very ground and exist-
ence of a representative, democratic type of government. If society
thought these laws unjust and desired to change them, society, through its
legally elected representatives, would so hav done. Proponents of the
civil jury justify this new function of the jury by contending that the laws
are only general principles which are to be app'ied specifically to the facts
of a case as determined by the jury, in accordance with the jury's inter-
pretation of such vague, flexible standards as that of the "reasonable man."
This presupposes that these twelve men not only represent a cross-section
of the community but are permitted and are capable of making an objec-
tive judgment. This "presupposed" contention does not withstand objec-
tive scrutiny. There is strong evidence that, generally, the jury is numeri-
cally dominated by housewives and retired pecple.7
The inability of the jury to make a sound, objective finding of the facts
and then objectively to apply the law to these facts has often been attrib-
uted to the manner of selecting jurors and the resulting composition of the
jury. Entirely inexperienced and untrained, the jurors are opposed in their
hampered investigation of the facts, not only by the absence of first-hand
knowledge of the particular facts, but by the designed and effective his-
trionics of experienced counsel and the deliberate deceptions of strongly
interested partisans. The evidence that would give light to the juror in his
blind quest is carefully concealed by one party and the other is strenuously
attempting to disclose it. The result is a distorted presentation of fact that
evidences the astuteness of respective counsel. Abysmal ignorance consti-
tutes a condition precedent in the qualification of jurors and that ignorance
must be established to the satisfaction of contending counsel.
The selection of jurors is considered an art among the most successful
trial attorneys. Whole volumes have been devoted to this art, but most
7 See HOLBROOK, A SURVEY OF METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, Los ANGELES AREA
(1956), as quoted verbatim in JOINER, CIVIL JUSTICE AND THE JURY, 195-200 (1962). A
survey of jurors in metropolitan Los Angeles area indicated that the jury does not
represent a cross section of the community. A poll of the area trial attorneys con-
cluded that many of the trial attorneys did not feel that ':he jurors serving represented
a true cross section of the community. They complained most often of too many
housewives and retired people and not enough executives or craftsmen. Although
a significant minority of the judges interviewed confirmed this view, the majority
indicated that in their opinion there was a reasonable cross section of the population
serving on juries, Significantly, this survey confirmed, in general, the view of the
trial attorneys and the minority judges.
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trial attorneys are familiar with some of the popular rules for selecting
jurors.8
The object of jury selection is to choose those individuals who will be
most influenced by the emotional displays of the attorney in his presenta-
tion of the case and by the participants in testifying. In presenting his
case to the jury, the attorney resorts to these emotional displays in order
to divert the attention of he jurors away from the legal concepts and
legally admissible evidence. This practice is most common in cases where
an individual is suing a large corporation or insurance company. This is
exemplified by the verdicts rendered by thirty juries which were divided
into three groups and asked to try the same case. The first group tried the
case where there was no mention of insurance. The second group tried
the case where the presence of insurance was inadvertently disclosed but
no further mention of it was made. The third group tried the case where
the presence of insurance was not only disclosed, but the juries were ex-
plicitly instructed by the judge to disregard the information. The mean
award of the group which was not informed of the insurance was $33,000.
The mean award of the group which was inadvertently informed of insur-
ance was $37,000. The mean award of the group which was explicitly in-
structed to disregard the mention of insurance was $46,000. 9 It is obvious
from the disparity of these awards that the mere fact that insurance was
present prejudiced the juries somewhat against the defendant with respect
to the amount of damages.
A comparison of verdicts rendered by judges and juries in cases involv-
ing individuals as plaintiffs and large corporations or insurance companies
as defendants indicates that emotional appeals to the juries might be suc-
cessful in deciding liability.'0
A comparison of the size of the awards rendered by judges and juries in
different kinds of cases also indicates that the juries are influenced by emo-
tional displays. In those kinds of cases where an emotional appeal is less
8 Latins are hotblooded and free with their money. Jews are coldblooded and tight
with their money. Professional men, executives and scientists are objective. Blue
collar workers, clerks and women are emotional, etc. See Kennelly, Jury Selection in
a Civil Case, 9 TRIAL LAW GUIDE 15 (1965); Busch, Observations as to the Manner and
Scope of Examination of Prospective Jurors, supra at 81, Vance, Voir Dire Examina-
tion of Jurors in Federal Civil Cases, supra at 90; Davis and Wiley, 49 Thoughts on
Jury Selection, supra at 110.
9 See KALVEN, REPORT ON THE JURY PROJECT, CONFERENCE ON AIMS AND METHODS
OF LEGAL RESEARCH, as quoted verbatim in JOINER, op. cit. supra note 7 at 201-214.
10 See Sunderland, Trial by Jury, 11 U. CINc. L. REv. 120 (1937), as quoted verbatim
in JOINER, op. cit. supra note 7 at 147-153. The jury rendered verdicts for the individ-
ual in 61% of the cases, while the judges rendered verdicts for the individual in only
51% of the cases. In cases where both the defendant and the plaintiff were either
both individuals or both large corporations, the judges and juries rendered verdicts
for each equally.
COMMENTS
likely to influence the jury, the judgments rendered by the jury cor-
responded on the average to the judgments rendered by the judges.1' The
results of these comparisons indicate that the jury is incapable of disregard-
ing the emotional appeals, and of rendering . judgment based upon the
legally admissible evidence.
Thus, one could conceivably conclude that not only is there a tendency
of the juries to allow their common prejudices to influence their decisions
with respect to the issue of liability, but that there is also a tendency to per-
mit emotional displays to influence their decisions with respect to amount
of liability.
These studies do not indicate that the jurie; do not dispense "justice."
Nonetheless, they demonstrate that this system is susceptible to non-legal
influences which in turn affect the quality of the justice dispensed.
Having established that the quality of justice dispensed by the jury sys-
tem is not the highest possible, it is necessary to proceed to analyze the
second function of the system, the quantity of iustice dispensed.
Perhaps the most prominent defect of the civil jury system is the enor-
mous backlog of jury cases which it has created. A backlog of cases per se
does not indicate a defect inherent in the system. However, the defect need
not be inherent in the system to justify its modification or abolition. Even
if we could only achieve the same minimum quality of justice dispensed by
the civil jury system, but eliminate the backlog through modification or
abolition of that system at a lesser cost than is necessary to eliminate the
backlog through retention and expansion of that system, it would be both
impractical and unfair to the public not to adopt modification or abolition.
Delays in bringing a case to jury trial vary among jurisdictions, but the
average delay as of 1962 was 14 months. Cook County, Ilinois had a delay
of approximately 71 months.1 2 The figures revealed an apparent correlation
between the population of the jurisdictions and the degree of calendar con-
gestion.' 3 The delay increased with the number of inhabitants of the juris-
diction. In order to appreciate the meaning and significance of these
figures, it is necessary to attempt to translate the numbers into human
terms and observe the effect of the backlog on those seeking justice. An
individual who files suit in April of 1962 for damages resulting from an
11 Ibid.
12 See INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, STATE TRIAL COURTS OF GENERAL
JURISDICTION: 1962 CALENDAR STATUS STUDY 1-3 (July 10, 1962). The average delay,
from the filing of a suit until jury trial, increased steadily from 9.4 months in 1957
to 14 months in 1962.
13 Ibid. In counties having a population under 500,000, the average delay was 7.1
months. In the counties having a population between 500,000 and 700,000, the average
delay increased to 15.1 months. In the counties having a population over 750,000, the
average delay increased to 23.9 months.
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automobile accident could imaginably be forced to wait until March of
1968 for a jury trial. Presuming that the injury will prevent the individual
from working for a considerable length of time, that the individual's salary
is his family's sole means of support and that he has little if any money
reserves to fall back on, the delay may force the plaintiff into an unfavor-
able, if not unjust, settlement with the defendant.
Although a delay of 70 months is the extreme, even the average delay in
1962, 14 months, or the lowest average since 1957, 9.4 months, 14 is a delay
which could conceivably cause many injured individuals to forego com-
plete justice for immediate relief. It is reasonable to say that any delay in
justice is a disadvantage to the plaintiff and an advantage to the defendant,
and that the longer the delay, the greater the disadvantage to the plainiff
and the more likelihood of an unjust settlement. A system which fosters
unjust settlements cannot be said to dispense a high quality of justice.
No jurist would deny the existence of the blacklog and its detrimental
effect on the dispensation of justice, nor would any deny the necessity of
eliminating the backlog. But many will argue the means which should be
employed to accomplish this goal. One factor in considering the different
proposals which cannot be disregarded is the cost of the alternative systems,
both in terms of time and money. The distinction between the cost of a
system in terms of time and money is frequently vague due to the fact that
time is money. Jury trials are expensive from both the standpoint of time
and the standpoint of money.
The cost to the national and state governments of maintaining the civil
jury system is a conservative $200,000,000.15 This figure does not include
the cost to the parties litigant nor to jurors' or witnesses who must give
up work to appear in court. Add to this loss the loss incurred by the em-
ployer of these jurors as a result of the loss of productivity of these people
during the trial. This loss of productivity, however small, is passed along
to the consumer in the form of higher prices.
A jury trial takes 60 per cent more time than a judge trial, excluding the
14Ibid.
15 See Summers, Some Merits of Civil Jury, 39 TUL. L. REV. 3 (1961). There are
approximately 100,000 jury trials each year in the United States. See Broeder, Univer-
sity of Cbicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REV. 744 (1959). It has been conservatively
estimated that the cost of one jury trial in the state is $2,000.
16 See INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, JURY COSTS: 1960 Supp. (August 15,
1960). Depending on the jurisdiction, the per diem compensation alloted to the jurors
ranges from as low as $2 per day to as high as $10 per day. See READER'S DIGEST,
ALMANAE 278 (1966). Considering that the average laborer makes a minimum of $20
per day and that somewhere in the area of 100,000 people are called to report tojury duty daily (see Broeder, supra note 15), the minimum loss to those serving asjurors is a total of $20,000,000.
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time required in jury deliberation and impanelling the jury.' The factors
for jury deliberation and jury impanelling are too variable and negligible
to be considered in the time evaluation of a jury as compared to a bench
trial.18 It appears that on a quantitative basis, the civil jury system is far
less efficient than the judiciary system. If it can be established that the
judiciary system dispenses even the same minimum quality of justice as
does the civil jury system, it would be uneconomical and impractical to
choose the jury system over the judiciary system.
As a result of the criticism of the civil jury system arising mainly out of
the previously discussed defects, several alternative systems have been pro-
posed. The more moderate proposals center around modifying or stream-
lining the present system. The more prominent proposals include the estab-
lishment of administrative boards in the nature of Workmen's Compensa-
tion boards to handle automobile tort cases; the enactment of a compulsory
arbitration statute, such as the one in use in Pennsylvania, and, finally, the
abolition of the civil jury system entirely and the substitution of a judiciary
system.
MODIFICATION
The major premise sustaining these proposals is that there is nothing in-
herently defective with the civil jury system and, therefore, the present
system will, when modified, be more able efficiently to deal with the in-
creasing amount of litigation. One can classify these proposals into two
general categories, procedural modifications and substantive modifications.
The procedural modifications include the expanded use of the pre-trial
conference, more liberal rules governing discovery procedures, use of an
impartial board of medical experts to testify in personal injury cases, in-
17 See ZEISEL, KALVEN, BUCHHOLZ, DELAY IN THE COURT (1959). Three independent
approaches were employed in determining that a bench trial is, on the average, 40%
shorter than a jury trial.
Is Ibid. The time element for jury impanelling may increase the difference, de-
pending upon whether the jurisdiction requires the presence of the judge. If the judge
need not be present, there would be no increase in the time required by a jury trial,
since the judge could devote his time to other judicial matters. However, if the judge's
presence is required, the time requirement for a jury trial would exceed that approxi-
mated in the study. Therefore, a jury trial in such a case would be more than 60%
longer than a bench trial. Jury deliberation as a time factor may have opposite and
varying effects on the time difference between a jury and a bench trial. Since a judge
is required to devote time in composing and writing an opinion, he may spend more
time in doing that than a jury would spend deliberating the verdict. However, any
savings in time resulting from jury deliberations, taking on the average less time than
composing and writing judicial opinions, could not substantially reduce the length
of time. In those jurisdictions, such as Illinois (see Ill. Supreme Court Rule 24-1 ILL.
REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 101.24-1, 1965), where the judge's presence is required during
voir dire, there would be no substantial savings.
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creased control of voir dire examination by the judge and more stringent
rules governing excusal from jury duty.
Expanded use of the pre-trial conference, together with a more liberal
discovery procedure, remove the element of surprise and permit a more
accurate appraisal of the merits of the case. Both of these procedures help
to create an atmosphere more conducive to a speedy, just settlement. It is
unanimously conceded that pre-trial and discovery probably speed settle-
ments and may even result in more equitable settlements.19 Without fur-
ther studies, it is difficult to see how pre-trial conferences affect those cases
which normally go to trial, those which make up the backlog.
The purpose of the expanded use of impartial expert medical testimony
is to reduce the time spent by opposing counsel in attempting to over-
whelm each other, and the jury, with conflicting and contradicting medical
evidence. In most personal injury cases, each side introduces its own ex-
perts to establish its contentions. The number of experts produced by each
side is limited only by the funds available to pay for their services. In an
important case, the jury may be forced to listen for days to the opposing
medical experts. By limiting the number of expert medical witnesses avail-
able to counsel or by substituting an impartial board of medical experts,
one could conceivably reduce substantially the time required for a complex
personal injury case.
In the past, attorneys have often used the voir dire examination as a
means of ingratiating themselves with the jury. It is at this stage that an
attorney brings to bear his ability to outwit the opposing counsel in select-
ing jurors most susceptible to the argument the attorney proposes to pre-
sent to the jury. In order to avoid the time often spent by the counsels in
outwitting one another, and in order to prevent the attorneys from in-
gratiating themselves with the jurors, many jurists propose withdrawing
control of the voir dire from the counsel and vesting control in the judge.
This procedure would no doubt increase somewhat the quality of justice
dispensed by the civil jury system, but it would also increase the length of
time necessary for a civil jury trial, thereby increasing the backlog.
Still another proposal is directed at improving the quality of the jurors
by permitting less excusals. There tends to be too few executives, profes-
sionals, craftsmen, and even white collar workers on the jury and too many
women and housewives.20 Although the proposed remedy would, if effec-
19 Note, 21 U. Pin-. L. REv. 52 (1959). In the federal district court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania, 40% of those cases brought to pre-trial conference were
settled at conference, 10-20% after conference and another 40% after the jury had
been selected. The report fails to note the high percentage of cases normally settled
before a jury verdict is reached. It is, therefore, difficult to determine the effects of
pre-trial conference in reducing the backlog from this study.
20 Supra note 7.
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tive, increase the quality of justice somewhat, it too would fail to decrease
the backlog. It would also seem that this proposal would be impractical to
implement and would fail to accomplish its purpose. However, there are
no figures or studies available from which to draw any conclusion.
It seems that although these procedural devices may increase the quality
of justice rendered by the jury, they make no substantial improvement in
the quantity of justice dispensed by the system. They fail to affect those
cases which require a jury trial and cannot, therefore, conceivably remedy
the quantitative defect of the civil jury system.
There are usually three proposals involving substantive modifications:
reduce the size of the jury; eliminate the unanimous verdict requirement;
and use two juries, one to determine liability and one to determine the
damages.
It has been suggested that by reducing the size of the jury, one reduces
both the time necessary for impanelling the jury and the cost of maintain-
ing the jury proportionately. 21 The savings could go toward providing
more judges and courtrooms and in that manner somewhat decrease the
backlog. Also, in those jurisdictions wherein the judge is required to be
present during the voir dire examination, the judge could devote this added
time to other judicial matters and thereby help to decrease somewhat the
backlog. It has even been suggested that by reducing the size of the jury,
one reduces the time necessary for deliberation in that there are fewer
people to convince and fewer to disagree. Taking into consideration the
low compensation paid to jurors22 and the high cost of judicial administra-
tion, the money saved in any one jurisdiction through reduction in the
size of the jury would hardly be sufficient to increase substantially the
amount of judicial administration. These factors do not materially affect
the comparative lengths of the jury or the bench trials.
Those who propose the elimination of the unanimous verdict require-
ment contend that a majority verdict would not only expedite jury deliber-
ations but would also reduce the number of hung juries. It has been sur-
mised that hung juries result chiefly from the personality of the hanging
juror and would be eliminated by relaxing the unanimity rule. 28 There is
evidence that if the state required 8/12 (2/3) verdict, 36 per cent of the
cases would have been decided on the first ballot and that if the state re-
quired only a simple majority vote over 90 per cent of all the cases could
21 See INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, Op. cit. supra note 16. Since the per
diem compensation to a juror ranges from between $2 and $10 per day, the averagejury trial requires two days (supra note 10) and an estimated 1,000,000 people will
be called upon for jury duty (see Broeder, supra note 15), the cost to the federal and
state governments for maintaining the juries ranges between $4,000,000 and $20,000,000
per year.
22 Supra note 6. 28 Supra note 9 at 202.
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be determined on the first ballot.24 It may, therefore, be surmised that the
unanimity rule, as opposed to a simple majority rule, affected the final
results of something less than 10 per cent of the cases. But for the unanim-
ity rule, the verdicts in 10 per cent of the cases would have been the oppo-
site. If any of these decisions were just decisions, the quality of justice
would have been sacrificed by the simple majority rule.
It is further argued that since the standard for judging liability in a civil
action is merely a preponderance of proof, a party should only be re-
quired to persuade a preponderance of the jury of his innocence. If the
jurors had been instructed with respect to a simple majority rule, they may
have been less prone to vote the way they had under the unanimity rule.
Where one is aware of the more significant consequences of his vote, he is
more apt to guard that power rather than exercise it hastily. There have
been no comparative studies nor are figures available from which to deter-
mine whether and to what extent a majority rule reduces the time required
for jury deliberation. When one considers that hung juries are relatively
rare, it is apparent that the majority rule would not go a long way toward
reducing the backlog.
Unlike the proposals to reduce the size of the jury and to eliminate the
unanimity rule, which are primarily directed at the quantitative aspects of
the civil jury system, the suggestion to employ two juries is directed pri-
marily at the qualitative aspects of the civil jury system. It has been shown
that the amount of damages awarded is a variable of the clarity of proof of
liability as well as of the clarity of proof of damages.25 This, in effect, is the
result of the jury applying a comparative negligence standard rather than
the doctrine of contributory negligence prescribed by the law. In an
attempt to prevent confusion of the two issues, the federal courts have
recently adopted the use of dual juries. This device undoubtedly results in
a higher quality of justice. As of yet there are not sufficient results to dis-
cern the effects of this device on the backlog. It is hard to conceive that this
system could have anything but a detrimental effect on the quantitative
aspect 26 of the civil jury system regardless of the beneficial effect on the
qualitative aspect.
24 Ibid.
25 See supra note 9. In presenting the facts of a case to one group of juries, liability
was made absolutely clear while in presenting the facts of the same case to another
group of juries, liability was made somewhat ambiguous. When liability was made
clear, the mean award was $41,000. Where liability was made ambiguous, the mean
award was only $34,000. The report concluded that the jury tends to combine the
liability and damage issues.
26See KALVEN, A GENERAL ANALYSIS OF AND INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM OF
COURT CONGESTION 7 (1960). An indication of the difference in time required to con-
duct jury trial, as opposed to a bench trial, is indicated by the results of the different
systems in New York and in Cook County, Illinois. In New York 71% of all the cases
filed were settled without a jury in 16.2% of the court's time. See COOK COUNTY
COMMENTS
ADMINISTRATIVE BOARDS
In the battle to eliminate the jury calendar backlog, many jurists have
gone so far as to advocate the abolition of the civil jury system in part or in
its entirety. The proponents of such action offer basically three substitutes
for the jury: establishment of administrative bureaus in the nature of
W'Vorkmen's Compensation boards to dispose of automobile tort cases; com-
pulsory arbitration for a certain class of cases; or a judiciary system.
It seems generally agreed that the bulk and core of contested civil jury
cases are those arising from personal injuries sustained in auto accidents. 27
It has been suggested that the jury calendar backlog could be eliminated by
withdrawing automobile injury cases from the civil jury and submitting
them to administrative boards in the nature of Workmen's Compensation
boards. The same reasons are offered for the change as were offered for the
adoption of the Workmen's Compensation Acts. These reasons include the
ever-increasing number of automobile cases and the ensuing social prob-
lems they create. The objective of the proposed system would be the same
as that of Workmen's Compensation, that is, to provide a prompt, simple
and sure remedy for victims of automobile accidents. A study of the opera-
tions and results of Workmen's Compensation boards indicates that al-
though they have reduced delay in having the case heard, they did not
abolish the delay, and there was a general dissatisfaction with the quality of
justice dispensed by the system. The purported purpose of the Act was to
prevent delay and thereby discourage settlement. The fact that settlements
persist and are encouraged in over one half of the jurisdictions reporting. 28
indicates that the system fails to prevent delay.
Delays by the various Workmen's Compensation boards can be traced
somewhat to the practice in most jurisdictions of not announcing decisions
at the hearing, but announcing them sometime later. The hearings them-
DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, SPECIAL BULLETIN (October 8, 1963). In Cook County, 45%
of all the cases disposed of were with a jury in 75% of the court's time while the
remaining 55% of the cases required only 25% of the court's time.
27 See ZEISEL, KALVEN AND BUCHHOLZ, supra note 17. The ratio of jury to non-jury
filings for personal injury cases is 5:1, while this ratio for all other types of cases is
only 3:4. Personal injury complaints comprise one half of all those filed in New York.
See INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, DELAY AND CONGESTION IN STATE METRO-
POLITAN TRIAL COURTS: SUGGESTED REMEDIES SERIES NUMBER 12 (May 21, 1956). It is
estimated that automobile accidents account for anywhere from 70 to 90% of all
personal injury complaints.
28 See INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, ADMINISTRATIVE BOARDS FOR AUTO-
MOBILE TORT CASES: WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMPARED. DELAY AND CONGESTION-
SUGGESTED REMEDIES SERIES NUMBER 8 (May 15, 1956). Out of 24 jurisdictions report-
ing, 10 discouraged private settlement, 5 encouraged it and 8 encouraged it subject
to a hearing before the Commission, while one jurisdiction encouraged it subject to a
hearing before the Commissioner. As with the civil jury system, it was found that
the volume of private settlement grows in proportion to the delay encountered.
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selves are delayed by allowing time for the litigants to file briefs and wait-
ing for transcripts of testimony, indicating that these hearings are thought
of as court appearances. There is yet a further delay if the decision is
appealed. Other causes of the delay were attributed to the parties involved,
especially the insurance companies. 29
General complaints directed at the system are usually directed at the
quality of justice dispensed by the system, in the form of low benefit levels,
rather than the quantity of justice dispensed. Not only do the benefit
le~'els start off at initially low levels, but they are further reduced by the
added costs to the plaintiff of attorney's fees and compensation to expert
witnesses. 0
There are certain practical implications in establishing administrative
boards for automobile cases which must be considered. These include de-
termining the extent of coverage, the method of financing and award
schedules. 31 However, the effect of such a system on the standards of fault
and negligence in our society are more important considerations. The
standards of fault and negligence are the basis of our tort law, in particular,
and of our entire legal system in general. The Workmen's Compensation
Acts make no attempt to maintain these standards in the instance of indus-
trial or occupational accidents. Such an attempt would destroy the ra-
tionale behind the system. Allegedly, accidents are an inherent consequence
of industrialization for which industry, aided in part by the state, must be
prepared to compensate the injured. This burden of compensation is passed
on to the general public represented by the consumer in the form of higher
prices. It is difficult to equate industrial accidents which occur within spec-
ified geographical and time restrictions to automobile accidents which can
occur literally anywhere at any time. Industry also lacks that personal ele-
ment which automobile accidents embody. A large corporation operating
many complex machines and employing many individuals to run and
service these machines can hardly be equated with the single, individual
driver of an automobile who injures the person or property of another. It
is difficult to place blame upon an impersonal large corporation for an in-
jury suffered by one of its numerous employees during the operation of
one of its many complex machines. However, it is even more difficult to
burden society with the cost of an injury when the fault of an individual
involved in an automobile tort case is relatively easily determinable. If one
were to abandon the standards of fault and negligence in automobile cases
where the conduct is usually personal and individual, it would not be diffi-
cult to abandon these standards in any other category of cases involving
29 Id. at 13. As is the case in the civil jury system, it is not uncommon for the in-
surance companies to postpone the hearing indefinitely in order to force a settlement.
301d. at same study generally. 31 ld. at 21.
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personal, individual conduct which includes the whole field of tort law.
Unless society chooses to reject the standards of fault and negligence, the
civil jury system cannot be abandoned in favor of administrative boards in
the nature of Workmen's Compensation boards. It would seem that such
administrative boards would go a long way in eliminating the jury calendar
backlog, but only at the unacceptable sacrifice in the quality of justice dis-
pensed. Quality, not quantity, should be the primary objective of any judi-
cial system. Only where increased quantity can be achieved without a re-
sulting decrease'in quality will a proposed alternative to the'civil jury sys-
tem be considered.
COMPULSORY ARBITRATION
Compulsory arbitration has been adopted by Pennsylvania as one means
of eliminating the jury calendar backlog.3 2 The statute permits the courts
of common pleas to provide by rules that all cases which are at issue, where
the amount in controversy is $2,000 or less, except those involving real
estate, be submitted to and be heard by a board of three members of the bar
in the judicial district. The county is to establish fees for the arbitrators and
pay them and establish rules of procedure. Either party may appeal from
the award to the court in which the cause was pending at the time the case
was referred to arbitration, provided that the party appealing shall first
repay to the county up to 50 per cent of the fees of the members of the
board of arbitrators. Such fees shall not be taxed as costs to the adverse
party, nor are they recoverable in any proceeding. All appeals are de novo;
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in 1955, held the Pennsylvania
Compulsory Arbitration Statute constitutional under both federal and
state constitutions, and the United States Supreme Court dismissed the
appeal without argument.33
Some practical problems have arisen from the operation of the statute.
It was feared that an attorney acting as an arbitrator may fear retribution
at a later date if he injured a fellow attorney by an unfavorble decision.
Proponents of the system contend that any "get even" tendency is negated
by requiring three attorneys serve on each board. However, it was sug-
gested by one participating county bar member in Pennsylvania that one
impartial layman serve with two attorneys to further protect against this
tendency.34
32 PA. STAT. tit. 5, §§ 30, 70 (Supp. 1959).
33Application of Harvey A. Smith, 381 Pa. 223, 112 A.2d 625 (1955), appeal dis-
missed sub nom, Smith v. Wessler, 350 U.S. 858 (1955). The Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania held that the condition precedent to a trial by jury required by the statute
was not a hardship.
34 See INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION AND COURT
CONGESTION: THE PENNSYLVANIA COMPULSORY ARBITRATION STATUTE 8, 9 (July 1, 1956).
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Attorneys frequently specialize in defense or trial work and become
known as plaintiffs' attorneys or defendants' attorneys. It was feared that,
if such attorneys are permitted to act as arbitrators and make rulings, they
will attempt to establish rulings favorable to their specialty. It is pointed
out that not only is it necessary to get a concurrence of two of the three
attorneys serving on each board but any one attorney has very few oppor-
tunities to make such a ruling. An attorney rarely serves more than three
or four times yearly. Furthermore, since rulings are subject to appeal by
trial de novo, it would be foolish to make such a prejudicial ruling which
almost certainly would be appealed.85
Perhaps the greatest fear arising out of the application of the statute is
that concerned with the arbitrators' compensation. The usual fee for an
attorney serving as an arbitrator is $25 per case. It is contended by many
that such a low fee will attract the inexperienced and inept attorneys. This
has proven to be incorrect in the experience of Pennsylvania. Participation
by the county bar associations has been between fifty and one hundred
per cent. The overwhelming majority of those attorneys serving as arbi-
trators have done so out of a sense of public duty. However, this conjures
up the fear that as the system expands, and greater demands on the time
and services of the attorneys are made by the system, attorneys will re-
fuse to serve. This fear could be allayed in one of two ways: insure
adequate compensation for those desirous to serve as arbitrators, or admin-
ister the system in such a manner that attorneys will not be called upon
to serve more than a specified maximum number of times per year. 6
A general objection voiced by those attorneys who have served both as
arbitrators and as counsel before the boards is that the attorneys who ap-
pear before the boards are not as prepared as if they were pleading a case
in court. Most observers attribute this tendency to the fact that there is
no judge or jury and that there is always the right to appeal for a trial
de novo. The situation may remedy itself, however, because clients will
tend to choose those attorneys who are successful in the field of arbitra-
tion. This would exclude those who suffer adverse decisions due to con-
sistent unpreparedness. Furthermore, the small number of appeals being
taken does not justify speculation that the right to appeal creates a lax
attitude on the part of the attorney. 7
The system was offered to the counties in Pennsylvania in 1953 and
through March, 1956, 43 out of the 67 counties had adopted compulsory
arbitration by rule.38 The report of the survey of the results of the system
through 1956 concluded that the procedure removes small claims for dam-
ages from the regular jury trial list, that the procedure is effective in speed-
35 Id. at 10. 37 Id. at 9, 10.
36 Id at 9. 38 Id. at 12.
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ing trials of larger cases, that the procedure is economical and that the
procedure has been well received by the majority of attorneys in the
counties in which it has been adopted.39 However, some doubt was ex-
pressed as to the adaptability of the system to metropolitan areas. 40 This
doubt has been allayed somewhat by the results of the use of arbitration
by the Philadelphia Municipal Court.41 In Philadelphia the number of
appeals being taken in the metropolitan area was the same proportionally
as that in the outlying counties. 42 It appears that the system in Philadelphia
has proven very effective in handling small claims and there appears to
be a decrease not only in the cost of judicial administration, but also in the
size of the jury backlog. 43
Citing the results of the system in Philadelphia between 1959 and 1961,
the arbitration commissioner of Philadelphia referred to the achievements
as "the miracle of compulsory arbitration. ' 44 Chief Justice Stern, of the
Common Pleas Court of Pennsylvania, commenting on the reaction of the
litigants to the system, said:
[Tihe plaintiffs expressed satisfaction because they get a prompt hearing of
their cases with resulting prompt payments.... On the other hand, the defend-
ants were equally pleased because they felt protected from the danger of reck-
less and extravagant verdicts, and were satisfied that the amounts found were
fair and reasonable.45
Some jurists contend that the cases handled by arbitration do not affect
the jury calendar backlog in that these cases would never get to trial any-
way.46 They contend that these cases are discontinued or settled before
3 9 1d. at 15. 401d. at 16.
41 See INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION AND COURT
CONGESTION: THE PENNSYLVANIA COMPULSORY ARBITRATION STATuTE-A SUPPLEMEN-
TARY REPORT 1958 (August 15, 1959). Arbitration was extended to the Philadelphia
Municipal Court in 1957 (PA. STAT. tit. 5, §§ 23, 30, 57, 73, Purdon Supp. 1958), at
which time the jurisdiction under the act was extended to include cases involving
$5,000 or less (PA. STAT. tit. 17 § 693, Purdon Supp. 1958). A survey of the results of
the system through 1959 found that as a rule there were no appeals from awards
under $400. The survey resulted in two recommendations: (1) that the board of
arbitrators be composed of one businessman in the particular field covered by the
case, one attorney and one impartial layman, and (2) that the boards sit in other
counties to remove the personality factor from arbitration.
42 Id. at 13.
43 Ibid. The study did not, however, indicate the dollar saving in the cost of judicial
administration or the decrease in the backlog.
44 1961 Arbitration Commissioner of County Court of Philadelphia Report, as cited
in Summers supra note 15 at 7.
45 Brass, Should jury Trials Be Abolished in Civil Cases? 37 N.Y.S.B.J. 157, 160
(1965).
46 INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, op. cit. supra note 34 at 38.
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coming to trial. This objection finds support in the calendar studies for the
years following adoption which indicated a marked increase in jury calen-
dar backlogs of these courts even after adoption of arbitration. 47 Presum-
ing that the system continues to operate efficiently and with the coopera-
tion of the county bar associations, it appears that it does not achieve its
primary purpose which is to eliminate the jury calendar backlog. The big
increase in the backlogs of Philadelphia and Pittsburg does not indicate
whether compulsory arbitration has tended to aggravate the backlog but
is evidence that it has failed substantially either to eliminate the backlog
or even retard its growth. Compulsory arbitration, like the procedural and
substantive modifications, does not deal directly with those cases which
eventually go to trial and, therefore, cannot substantially remedy the
situation.
JUDICIARY SYSTEM
The only alternative proposal which directly confronts all of the prob-
lems presented by the civil jury system is the abolition of that system and
the substitution of a judiciary system. 48 Such a judiciary system would be
composed of three divisions. The first division would consist of three
judges elected for a term of years by the voters of the county wherein
the justices officiate. Wherever a jury trial is now authorized a concur-
rence of two out of the three justices would be necessary to decide a case.
In those cases where no jury trial is provided, one justice would officiate.
The second division, the appellate tribunal, would consist of five justices
also elected for a term of years, but by the vote of the state electorate.
These justices would set en bane and review on appeal the issues of both
law and fact by a concurrence of three out of the five justices. The third
division would be the supreme court. The court would consist of seven
members preferably elected for life by a general vote. This court, like the
appellate courts, would also review both questions of law and fact. Every
member of the court would be subject to removal for cause by a commis-
sion established by the judicial article and would run upon his record at
each election.
In response to the proposal to replace the civil jury trial with bench
trials, proponents of the civil jury point to the alleged disadvantages of a
judiciary system: the public is not brought into the case; there is no
adequate way to detect unconscious bias or prejudice on the part of a
judge since a voir dire examination of the judge would be unavailable; the
decision is made by a single man without the benefit of discussion with
others and the judge does not represent a cross-section of the community.
47 Supra note 12.
48 See Sebille, Trial by jury: An Ineffective Survival, 10 A.B.A.J. 53 (1924).
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The argument that the judiciary prevents direct participation in the
judicial process evolved from the democratic appeal of the institution of
trial by jury, that the jury acts as a shield against oppression and arbitrary
laws. This argument concludes that laws in a democratic society require
public support and that the best way in which to instill respect and confi-
dence in the judiciary and the laws of the state is to permit the common
citizen to participate directly in the judicial process. There is a foreboding
intimation in this argument that if the common citizen is denied this direct
participation, he will neither respect and support the law nor have confi-
dence in the judiciary.
The argument that the jury is a shield against oppression and arbitrary
laws was true at the inception of the civil jury system both in England and
in the United States. But laws in the United States are no longer governed
by King George III, nor does the Star Chamber, whose members were
appointed by the sovereign, dispense the law. There no longer exists this
threat of oppression and arbitrary law which gave rise to fear and distrust
of the judiciary. Laws are enacted by representatives of the people and
dispensed by a judiciary elected by the people49 and dependent upon the
continued support of the people for tenure.50
In Illinois the independence of the judiciary is further protected by the
specific denial of any power to anyone except the voters to appoint a new
judge or fill a vacancy.51 However, the new judicial article provides for
retirement of any judge for disability, for the suspension without pay,
or for the removal for cause of judges by a commission established by the
Supreme Court.52 The article also provides for the automatic retirement
of judges at an age prescribed by the General Assembly.53
The intimation that the denial of direct participation of the common
man in the administration of justice will undermine the public respect and
support of the laws and cause the public to lose confidence in its judiciary
finds no basis in history. There has been no great public outcry against the
administration of justice by the chancery courts or admiralty courts in the
United States nor against the judiciary systems applied in all other major
democratic countries, including England.
However, even if one were to accept the presumption that direct partici-
pation by the public is necessary to maintain public support and confidence
in the laws and the judiciary, the direct participation afforded to the public
through the civil jury system is insignificant. A study concerning the ex-
tent of direct contact of the general population with the jury system con-
49 ILL. CONST. art. VI 10. 51 Op. cit. supra note 41.
50 ILL. CONST. art. VI § 11. 52 ILL. CONST. art. VI § 18.
53 Ibid.
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cluded that although it is estimated that some 1,000,000 Americans serve
on juries, 54 it would appear that jury service is no longer the dominant
avenue for direct citizen contact with the court system. 55
It is suggested that this direct participation of the population may be a
factor in favorably influencing people's views toward the civil jury system.
A survey of jurors prior to and after jury service indicated that more
people who originally favored a jury trial shifted views than those who
had originally favored a bench trial.56 The general question about pref-
erence for jury or judge may frequently be understood by the respondent
as a qeustion about criminal trials.57 It concluded that jury experience
tends to keep one enthusiastic about the jury in criminal cases and make
him less enthusiastic about it in contract cases.58 Because of the opportuni-
ties for avoiding jury service, those who do serve in effect choose to do
so and are very probably more favorable to the jury at the outset.59
Therefore, the figures indicating those in favor of a jury would be favor-
ably exaggerated, while those in favor of a judge would be unfavorably
exaggerated. Although the public is generally favorable to trial by jury,60
there is evidence that the public is generally unfavorable toward serving
on a jury.61 The conflicting attitudes of the general public toward two
aspects of the same system suggests that many people who respond favor-
ably to trial by jury do so for emotional and psychological reasons. These
people equate the institution of trial by jury with democracy and freedom.
Nevertheless, they reject participation in the system when demands are
made upon their time, indicating that direct public participation in the
administration of justice is avoided by the public.
It appears that there is no basis for the argument that direct public par-
ticipation is necessary to maintain the public support and respect for the
law and the continued confidence in the judiciary system. There are indi-
cations that support for the jury system declines after direct participa-
tion. 2 The emotional and psychological attachment by the public to the
54 Broeder, supra note 15. (0.55% of the population of 1960 census count).
55 Supra note 9 at 203.
56 Id. at 204. 19% of those favoring jury trial shifted to judge while only 17% of
those favoring a judge trial shifted to jury trial.
57 Id. at 205. Prior to jury service 5% preferred a judge in criminal cases and 28%
in contract cases. After jury service 10% preferred a judge in criminal cases while
55% in contract cases.
58 Ibid. 59 Supra note 9 at 203.
6oSupra note 9 at 204. 70% favored trial by jury, 21% were undecided and 9%
favored trial by judge.
61 Supra note 9 at 203. Among those who had never served only 36% said they would
like to serve, 16% were undecided and 48% said they would not like to serve.
62 Supra note 9 at 204. The percentage favoring jury trial dropped 7% while the
percentage favoring bench trial increased 10%.
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institution of trial by jury is no formidable impediment to the abolition
of the civil jury system. If the public can be made more aware of the
distinction between the proposal to abolish trial by jury in criminal cases
rather than the proposal to abolish trial by jury in all cases, and can be
adequately informed of the relative disadvantages of the civil jury system
and advantages of the judiciary system, a great deal of the opposition to
the judiciary system might disappear.
The argument that there is no way to detect unconscious bias or preju-
dice in a judge, even if true, is not significant. It is true that it is impractical
for counsel to conduct a voir dire examination of the judge. However, in
the proposed judiciary system, the findings of both law and fact are re-
viewed on appeal. It is necessary for the judge in his opinion to justify
not only his application of the law to the facts but also his findings of the
facts according to the evidence presented. This is not true of the jury.
The proceedings in the jury room are shrouded in a cloak of mystery.
The jury neither has to justify its finding of the facts nor its application
of the law to these facts. The jury merely renders a verdict of "guilty"
or "not guilty." The jury occupies a unique status among democratic
institutions in that its acts are not subjected to the investigation of a re-
visory power. The only instance where the judge is permitted to set aside
a verdict is when the verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence.
In most cases, if the verdict was against such evidence, the judge could
have directed a verdict. Therefore, there was no need for a jury in such
circumstances in the first place. The law precludes an appellate court from
disturbing the fact-finding of the jury in the trial court. There is an almost
conclusive presumption at law that the jury was not prejudiced by extrane-
ous, non-legal, influences. However, it is common knowledge that jury
selection is directed by counsel at obtaining on the jury those people most
susceptible to extraneous, non-legal, influences and that the present system
for supplying jurors accommodates the attorney in achieving his kind of
jury.63 In comparison with the provisions of a judiciary system in protect-
ing a litigant from bias and prejudice in a decision of the merits of his case,
the jury system offers little.
In conjunction with the argument of the inability to detect unconscious
bias and prejudice in a judge, proponents of the civil jury system contend
that the judge as a single man lacks the advantage of discussions with others
in deciding the issues. There is an implication in their argument that be-
cause the judge does not have this opportunity to discuss his opinions with
others, he will himself be unable to render an objective decision. The
argument reasonably assumes that the judge like any other individual has
certain unconscious biases and prejudices. Every individual is a product of
63 See 15 DE PAUL L. REV. 398 (1966).
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his environment and as such he is influenced in his decisions by his environ-
ment. The judge's opinions and decisions must in some way reflect the
values of his environment. It is contended that besides such innate biases
and prejudices, the single judge has to contend with the biases and preju-
dices which result from his training and experience in the field of law.
The proponents of the civil jury system argue that there is an inclination
on the part of the judge to categorize the fact situations, to place the fact
situations which confront him into patterns which have evolved as a result
of his training and experience. They contend that with a jury of twelve,
there is a tendency of individual prejudices to cancel out or equalize each
other. During jury 'deliberation, bias or. distortion can be brought to the
surface and neutralized. This theory is commonly referred to as the
"safety in numbers" theory. This argument fails to note the inconsistency
between what the jury purports to accomplish and the actual results. The
jury purports to cancel out or neutralize prejudices, yet it has been indi-
cated that the jury crystallizes common prejudices rather than eliminating
personal prejudices.64 However, the judge, unlike the jury, is trained for
the difficult task of hearing conflicting testimony and of synthesizing and
reconciling it, of judging witnesses and the truth of their statements and
of deducing the truth or falsity of particular testimony by the coherence
or incoherence of the whole. Although a judge may form certain patterns
into which certain fact situations may easily fit, the judge in deciding each
case must contend with the particular facts of the case and justify not only
his fact-finding but his application of the law as well. The arguments con-
cerning the alleged involuntary bias and prejudice of a single judge do
not take into consideration the fact that the judiciary system proposed
substitutes three judges wherever there was previously a jury trial. There
will not only be the element of discussion and deliberation in such cases
but such discussion and deliberation will exist on a more qualified and
competent level than that of the jury.
Some proponents of the civil jury. system would justify the jury's dis-
regard of the judge's instructions and reliance on extraneous, non-legal
factors, such as emotions and passions, on the ground that it is a function
of the jury to temper justice with the conscience of the community.
Allegedly, the jury representing a cross-section of the community is better
equipped to apply the general principles of law established by society.
The standard of a "reasonable man" is determined in each society by the
people who make up that society. The jury, it is contended, is the reason-
able man for that community. It matters not that in tempering the law a
jury of twelve men changes the law enacted by the whole community.
There is evidence that the jury neither represents a cross-sction of the
64 See 15 DEPAUL L. REV. 398 (1966).
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community nor is capable of rendering a decision consistent with the
law.15 The judiciary represents the community, also, and attempts to tem-
per justice with the conscience of the community. However, the judiciary
confines its attempts to temper justice within existing legal structure. It
does not attempt to change the laws. A judiciary elected by the people
must be somewhat responsive to the people who elect it. The judges do
not live in a vacuum but are, like the members of the jury, continually
subjected to the influences of the community.
One must only look to the examples of the equity, admiralty and nu-
merous administrative courts. These courts continue to function and dis-
pense justice without any great outcry from either attorneys or the public.
England, which is more culturally and socially related to the United States
than any other major power, exemplified the practicability and effective-
ness of limiting the right to a civil jury trial as early as 1883, and in 1918
that country, restricting it as a wartime measure, abolished it in all but a
few cases. After the war the restrictions to a right to a jury trial were
repealed for a short period but were reenacted again as a wartime measure
in 1933 and have continued in existence ever since.66 As Sir William Ken-
neth Diplock, Lord Justice of Appeal of England, commented: "The
whole atmosphere of civil litigation today is unsympathetic to technical
objections to admissibility."6' 7 The judge is more competent to hear and
judge "all" evidence objectively without weighing some evidence improp-
erly. He concluded that this is why the law of negligence in England is
growing simpler while the law of negligence in America is growing more
complex.68
The State of Louisiana has never guaranteed the right to a civil jury in
its constitution 69 and has drastically reduced that right in practice. 70 It is
interesting to note that prior to 1960 the backlog in the Civil District Court
of Orlean Parish 71 never exceeded three months, while the overwhelming
majority of the jurisdictions in this category never dropped below nine
months. 72
65 Supra note 54 and notes 10, 11 & 25.
66 See JACKSON, THE MACHINERY OF JUSTICE IN ENGLAND 66-68 (4th ed. 1964). See
Jackson, The Incidence of Jury Trial During the Past Century, 1937 MODERN L. REV.
132 (1937).
67 DIPLOCK, The Jury and Civil Action in England, 36 N.Y.S.B.J. 296, 299 (1964).
681d. at 301.
69 LA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
70 LA. C.C.P. ANN. art. 1733 (1961).
71 See supra note 13, wherein it lists the population in New Orleans as 627,525.
72 Ibid.
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CONCLUSION
The experience of England and the other major Western democratic
countries which have abandoned the civil jury system, 73 together with the
limited experience of Louisiana and of each of the states individually in
the areas of equity and admiralty, offer proof that the abolition of the
civil jury will not result in a loss of freedom or a lesser quality of justice.
A judiciary system dispenses, as a minimum, the same quality of justice as
the civil jury system, and there are indications that it dispenses a higher
quality of justice.74
It is not necessary that the civil jury system be abolished in its entirety
in one giant sweep, but it is necessary that the right to a civil jury be
curtailed or limited to some extent as has been done in Louisiana. 75 Before
any limitation can be placed upon the right to a civil jury trial in Illinois,
it is necessary to revise the state constitution which guarantees to all citi-
zens the right to a jury in civil cases. 76 The constitution should be revised
to guarantee the right to a jury only in criminal cases as is done in the
constitutions of Louisiana, Colorado, and Utah. 77 This mere revision of
the constitution to exclude the guarantee of a right to a jury in civil cases
will not of itself abolish that right. The right exists in the common law
of Illinois and can only be abolished or limited by legislative action. How-
ever, once the revision has been accomplished, the legislature would be
free to experiment with a judiciary system by limiting the right to a jury
trial rather than by abolishing it completely. Some practical measures
which could be attempted by the legislature upon revision of the state
constitution would be to abolish the right to a jury in all cases involving
$5,000 or under and restrict the right to a jury in actions on an uncondi-
tional obligation to pay a specific sum to the defenses of only fraud and
error. By abolishing the jury in actions involving $5,000 or under, it is
hoped to reduce the number of automobile tort cases which make up the
bulk of the backlog. These restrictions should not only substantially reduce
the backlog but they would allow the legislature and the citizens of the
state to judge for themselves the merits of a judiciary system. In Louisiana,
which has adopted measures similar to those suggested, only 300 jury
trials, both criminal and civil, plagued the district court dockets for all 64
parishes in 1962.78 By retaining the constitution in its present form, Illinois
is limited to experimenting only with modifications to the jury system,
none of which go directly to the problems of substantially improving the
73 Jury Abroad, 221 LAw TIMES 118 (March 9, 1956).
74 See comment, 15 DE PAUL L. REV. 398 (1966).
75 Supra note 70. 77 Supra notes 3, 4 & 5.
76 Supra note 1. 78 Summers, supra note 15 at 9.
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quality of justice or increasing the quantity of justice. Illinois has, in fact,
adopted nearly all the modifications suggested,7 9 yet Cook County con-
tinues to have the biggest backlog in the country. 0 Even adding more
judges has failed to either substantially reduce the backlog or prevent its
increase. This is due to the increased amount of litigation especially in the
area of automobile tort cases. Over a three-year period the number of
resident judges in the Circuit Court of Cook County increased more than
300 per cent, yet the jury calendar backlog was reduced by only 15.3
per cent.8 ' The addition of more judges did not, and could not, cope with
the increased amount of litigation. Only by limiting the right to a civil
jury trial will the jury calendar backlog be substantially reduced without
impairing the minimum quality of justice dispensed and, in all likelihood,
increasing the quality of justice.
There is no federal constitutional bar to the abolition of the jury in civil
cases. The only possible applicable provision in the United States Constitu-
tion is the seventh amendment which provides:
In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed $20, the
right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be
otherwise reexamined in any court of the United States than according to the
rules of the common law. 82
However, the United States Supreme Court has ruled that this amend-
ment is not a limitation on the powers of the state. 83 The court has even
gone so far as to say that in civil action in state courts, trial by jury may
be modified by the state or abolished altogether.84
Since there is no legal bar to abolishing the guarantee to a jury in civil
cases in our state constitution, it would be unreasonable and unfair to the
citizens of Illinois to deny the legislature and to themselves the power
to experiment with a system which could conceivably not only dispense
a higher quality of justice but also a substantially greater quantity.
Bruce Rashkow
79 See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 58, 58.1, 101.24-1 (1965); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
S 281 (1965).
80 Supra note 12.
81 See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE ILLINOIS COURTS, 1964 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE
SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS 63, 64, 77, 78 (1964). See MARNO AND FITZGERALD, IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS at 82, June 25, 1963.
82 U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
83 See U.S.C.A. CONST. amend. VI-XIV., notes 12 & 13 at 139. Spies v. Ill., 123 U.S.
131 (1887). See Keith v. Menkleman, 173 II. 143, 50 N.E. 692 (1898). See People v.
Kelly, 349 Il1. 221, 179 N.E. 898 (1931).
84 Olesen v. Trust Co. of Chicago, 245 F.2d 522 (7th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
896 (1957).
